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Abstract Philosophers have overall studied intentional actions that agents attempt
to perform in the world. However the pioneers of the logic of action, Belnap and
Perloff, and their followers have tended to neglect the intentionality proper to human
action. My primary goal is to formulate here a more general logic of action where
intentional actions are primary as in contemporary philosophy of mind. In my view,
any action that an agent performs involuntarily could in principle be intentional.
Moreover any involuntary action of an agent is an effect of intentional actions of
that agent. However, not all unintended effects of intentional actions are the contents
of unintentional actions, but only those that are historically contingent and that the
agent could have attempted to perform. So many events which happen to us in our
life are not really actions. My logic of action contains a theory of attempt, success
and action generation. Human agents are or at least feel free to act. Moreover their
actions are not determined. As Belnap pointed out, we need branching time and
historic modalities in the logic of action in order to account for indeterminism and
the freedom of action. Propositions with the same truth conditions are identified in
standard logic. However they are not the contents of the same attitudes of human
agents. I will exploit the resources of a non classical predicative propositional logic
which analyzes adequately the contents of attitudes. In order to explicate the nature
of intentional actions one must deal with the beliefs, desires and intentions of agents.
According to the current logical analysis of propositional attitudes based on Hin-
tikka’s epistemic logic, human agents are either perfectly rational or completely irra-
tional. I will criticize Hintikka’s approach and present a general logic of all cognitive
and volitive propositional attitudes that accounts for the imperfect but minimal ratio-
nality of human agents. I will consider subjective as well as objective possibilities and
explicate formally possession and satisfaction conditions of propositional attitudes.
Contrary to Belnap, I will take into account the intentionality of human agents and
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explicate success as well as satisfaction conditions of attempts and the various forms
of action generation. This chapter is a contribution to the logic of practical reason. I
will formulate at the end many fundamental laws of rationality in thought and action.
I will only consider here individual actions and attitudes of single agents at one
moment. Examples of such individual actions are intended body movements like vol-
untarily raising one’s arm, some effects of these movements like touching something
and saluting someone, mental actions like judgements and elementary illocutionary
acts such as assertions and requests. Whoever performs an action at a moment has
individual beliefs, desires and intentions at that very moment. Individual actions
(and attitudes) of agents at a single moment are the simplest kinds of action (and
attitudes) from a logical point of view. They part of other kinds of individual or
collective actions (and attitudes) which last during several moments of time.
In order to contribute to the foundations of the logic of action I will attempt to
answer general philosophical questions: What is the logical form of proper inten-
tional actions? Which attitudes do they contain? In my view, attempts are constitutive
of intentional actions. Attempted actions have success conditions: either agents suc-
ceed or fail in performing them? How can we define success and failure? We need
an account of agents’ reasons in our logic of action and attitudes. Indeed agents
have theoretical reasons for believing propositions and they make their attempts for
practical reasons. Their intentional actions can both create reasons and be subject to
demands for reasons i.e. for justifications. Moreover voluntary actions are related by
the relation of being means to achieve ends (Aristotle). Agents make their attempts
in order to perform other actions. How can we account for their objectives? Our
intentional actions have involuntary effects in the world. In walking intentionally on
the snow an agent might unintentionally slip and fall. What are the logical relations
that exist between our intentional and unintentional actions? Some types of action
strongly commit the agent to performing other types of action. Whoever shouts pro-
duces sounds. Any instance of an action of the first type contains an action of the
second type. Moreover certain action tokens generate others in certain circumstances.
Whoever expresses an attitude that he does not have, is lying. But he could be sin-
cere at another moment. What are the basic laws governing agentive commitment
and action generation? In particular, how can agents perform certain actions by way
of performing others? Are all actions performed by an agent at a moment generated
by a single basic intentional action of that agent at that moment? If yes, what is the
nature of basic actions?
As Brentano (1993) pointed out, agents of propositional attitudes and intentional
actions have intentionality: they are directed at objects and facts of the world that they
represent. From a logical point of view, propositional attitudes have logically related
conditions of possession and of satisfaction. Whoever possesses a propositional
attitude is in a certain mental state: he or she represents what has to happen in the
world in order that his or her attitude is satisfied. Beliefs are satisfied whenever
they are true, desires whenever they are realized and intentions whenever they are
executed. So agents having beliefs represent how things are in the world according
to them. Agents having desires represent how they would prefer things to be in the
world and agents having intentions represent how they should act in order to execute
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their intentions. Propositional attitudes consist of a psychological mode M with a
propositional content P. They are the simplest kinds of individual attitudes directed
at facts. My first objective here is to explicate adequately possession and satisfaction
conditions of all propositional attitudes. My second objective is to explicate the nature
of intentional actions and the different kinds of action generation whether voluntary
or not. According to standard epistemic logic human agents are either perfectly
rational or totally irrational. I will advocate an intermediate position compatible with
contemporary philosophy of mind according to which human agents are not perfectly
but minimally rational. In my logical approach, one can formulate adequate laws of
psychological commitment and avoid current epistemic and volitive paradoxes. In
order to account for minimal rationality1 I will exploit the resources of a non classical
propositional predicative logic that distinguishes propositions with the same truth
conditions that do not have the same cognitive or volitive value.
The structure of this chapter is the following. I will explain in the first section my
predicative analysis of propositional contents. Next I will explicate components of
psychological modes and define possession and satisfaction conditions of propo-
sitional attitudes. I will explain in the third section the principles2 of my logic
of action where intentional actions are primary as in contemporary philosophy.3
Because intentional actions are actions that agents attempt to perform in the world,
the basic individual actions of each agent are in my logic his or her primary attempts
(usually attempts of body movement). My ideographical object-language has richer
expressive capacities than that of Belnap. It expresses in addition to modalities,
time and individual actions of agents, their attempts and their cognitive and volitive
propositional attitudes. I will give a formal account of intentionality and explicate the
nature of attempts and forms of action generation in the fourth section.4 In the last
section I will enumerate a few valid laws of my logic after having criticized Searle’s
skepticism against the logic of practical reason. I will also explain why the logic of
action is so important for the purposes of illocutionary logic.
1 Analysis of Propositional Contents of Attitudes
Propositions with the same truth conditions are not the contents of the same attitudes
and intentional actions. One can believe and assert that Rome is a capital without
believing and asserting that it is a capital and not an erythrocyte. Moreover human
agents do not know a priori by virtue of competence the necessary truth of many
propositions. We have to learn a lot of essential properties of objects. By essential
property of an object I mean here a property that it really possesses in any possible
1 The notion of minimal rationality was first discussed by Cherniak (1986).
2 These principles were first stated in my paper “Attitudes, tentatives et actions” (Vanderveken
2008a).
3 See Bratman (1987), Davidson (1980), Goldman (1970), Searle (1982).
4 I define a model-theoretical semantics for my object-language in my next book Truth, Thought
and Action.
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circumstance. Each human agent has the essential property to have certain parents.
But some do not know their parents. Others are wrong about their identity; in that
case they have necessary false beliefs. However when agents are inconsistent, they
remain paraconsistent: as the Greek philosophers pointed out, they never believe nor
desire everything.
According to standard logic of attitudes (Hintikka 1971), relations of psycholog-
ical compatibility with the truth of beliefs and the realization of desires are modal
relations of accessibility between agents and moments, on one hand, and possible
circumstances, on the other hand. Possible circumstances are compatible with the
truth of agents’ beliefs at each moment of time. To each agent a and moment m there
corresponds in each model a unique set Belief(a,m) of possible circumstances that are
compatible with the truth of all beliefs of that agent at that moment. On Hintikka’s
view, an agent believes a proposition at a moment when that proposition is true in
all possible circumstances that are compatible with what that agent then believes.
Given such a formal approach, human agents are logically omniscient. They believe
all necessarily true propositions and their beliefs are closed under logical implica-
tion. Moreover, human agents are either perfectly rational or totally irrational. They
are perfectly rational when at least one possible circumstance is compatible with
what they believe. Otherwise, they are totally irrational. Whoever believes a neces-
sary falsehood believes all propositions according to the standard approach. But this
conclusion is clearly false.
One could introduce in logic so-called impossible circumstances where necessar-
ily false propositions would be true. But this move is very ad hoc and neither necessary
nor sufficient. In my approach, all circumstances remain possible. So objects keep
their essential properties (each of us keeps his real parents) and necessarily false
propositions remain false in all circumstances. In order to account for human incon-
sistency, we have to consider subjective in addition to objective possibilities. Many
subjective possibilities are not objective. So we need a non classical propositional
logic. My logic is predicative in the general sense that it takes into account acts of
predication that agents make in expressing and understanding propositions.5
In my view, each proposition has a finite structure of constituents. It predicates
attributes (properties or relations) of objects subsumed under concepts. We under-
stand a proposition when we understand which attributes objects of reference must
possess in a possible circumstance in order that this proposition be true in that cir-
cumstance. As Frege (1977) pointed out, we always refer to objects by subsuming
them under senses. We cannot directly have in mind individual objects like material
bodies and persons. We rather have in mind concepts of individuals and we indirectly
refer to them and predicate attributes of them through these concepts. So our attitudes
are directed towards individuals under a concept (called an individual concept) rather
than towards pure individuals. By recognizing the indispensable role of concepts in
reference and predication, predicative logic accounts for attitudes directed towards
5 See my papers “Propositional Identity, Truth According to Predication and Strong Implication”
(Vanderveken 2005a) and “Aspects cognitifs en logique intensionnelle et théorie de la vérité”
(Vanderveken 2009a).
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inexistent and even impossible objects. It also explains why attitudes and intentional
actions directed towards an individual under a concept are often not directed towards
the same individual under other concepts. Jocasta, the queen of Thebes, is Oedipus’
mother. In marrying Jocasta, Oedipus has then married his own mother. However he
believed at the time of his wedding that he had another mother. So he did not then
intend to marry his mother.
The logic of attitudes needs more than an analysis of the structure of constituents
of propositions; it requires a better explication of their truth conditions. Because we
ignore real denotations of most attributes and concepts in many circumstances, we
understand most propositions without knowing in which possible circumstances they
are true. One can refer to a friend’s wife without knowing who she is. However we can
always in principle think of persons who could be his wife. In my view most possible
uses and interpretations of a natural language, let us say for short, most models for
that language, consider a lot of possible denotation assignments to attributes and con-
cepts in addition to the standard real denotation assignment of classical logic which
associates with each propositional constituent its actual denotation in every possible
circumstance. All possible denotation assignments to attributes and concepts of each
model are functions of the same type; they associate with each individual concept a
unique individual or no individual at all and with each attribute of degree n a sequence
of n individual concepts in every possible circumstance. According to the real denota-
tion assignment of each model, my friend’s wife is the woman with whom he is really
married according to that model when there is such a person. According to other pos-
sible denotation assignments, his wife is another person or even he is not married. In
spite of their differences, all possible denotation assignments respect by definition
real meaning postulates that speakers have internalized in learning their language.
According to any, a wife is a married woman. We ignore the real denotation of most
concepts and attributes in many circumstances. We can only think of denotations that
they could have. When we express concepts and attributes only some possible deno-
tation assignments to them are then compatible with the truth of our beliefs. Suppose
that according to you my friend’s wife is young. In that case, possible denotation
assignments according to which she is old are then incompatible with your beliefs.
Possible denotation assignments rather than possible circumstances are compatible
with the beliefs of agents. So my logic accounts for subjective possibilities.
In my approach, the truth definition is relative to both possible circumstances
and denotation assignments. An elementary proposition predicating an extensional
property of an individual object under a concept is true in a circumstance according
to a denotation assignment in a model when according to that assignment the objec
which falls under that concept has that property in that circumstance. Otherwise, it is
false in that circumstance according to that assignment. In understanding propositions
we in general do not know whether they are true or false. We just know that their
truth in a circumstance is compatible with certain possible denotation assignments
to their concepts and attributes, and incompatible with all others. Most propositions
have then a lot of possible truth conditions. Of course, any proposition that is true in
a circumstance according to a model has to be true in that circumstance according to
the real denotation assignment of that model. So among all possible truth conditions
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of a proposition, its real Carnapian truth conditions correspond to the set of possible
circumstances where it is true according to the real denotation assignment.
In my view, propositions are identical when they make the same predications
and they are true in the same circumstances according to the same possible denota-
tion assignments. Such a finer criterion of propositional identity explains why many
strictly equivalent propositions have a different cognitive or volitive value. Proposi-
tions whose expression requires different predications have a different structure of
constituents. So are necessarily equivalent propositions that Rome is a capital and
that Rome is a capital and not an erythrocyte. One can express one without express-
ing the other. My identity criterion also distinguishes propositions that we do not
understand to be true in the same circumstances: these are not true according to the
same denotation assignments to their constituents. Few necessarily true propositions
are obvious (or pure) tautologies that we know a priori. In order to be necessarily
true a proposition has to be true in every possible circumstance according to the
real denotation assignment. In order to be obviously tautological, a proposition has
moreover to be true in every circumstance according to every possible denotation
assignment to its constituent senses.6 Unlike the proposition that Oedipus’ mother is
a woman, the necessarily true proposition that she is Jocasta is not an obvious tautol-
ogy. It is false according to possible denotation assignments. We now can explicate
subjective and objective possibilities. A proposition is subjectively possible when it
is true in a possible circumstance according to a possible denotation assignment. In
order to be objectively possible it has to be true in a circumstance according to the
real denotation assignment. Few subjective possibilities are objective.
The logic of action requires a ramified conception of time compatible with inde-
terminism. Attitudes and actions of human agents are not determined. When they do
or think something, they could have done or thought something else. In branching
time, a moment is a complete possible state of the actual world at a certain instant and
the temporal relation of anteriority between moments is partial rather than linear.
There is a single causal route to the past. However, there are multiple future routes.
Consequently, the set of moments of time is a tree-like frame of the following form:
.                .                            .          .                       .           .         
m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12 m13 m14 m15   
m3                        m
m
4                              m5                                           m6
m1                          m2
0
6 Obvious tautologies are called pure tautologies in most of my previous papers.
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A maximal chain h of moments of time is called a history. It represents a possible
course of history of our world. Some histories have a first and a last moment. Accord-
ing to these histories the world has a beginning and an end. As Belnap et al. (2001)
pointed out, each possible circumstance is a pair of a moment m and of a history h to
which that moment belongs. Thanks to histories temporal logic can analyze important
modal notions like settled truth and historic necessity. Certain propositions are true
at a moment according to all histories. Their truth is then settled at that moment no
matter how the world continues. So are past propositions and propositions attributing
propositional attitudes to agents. Whoever desires something at a moment desires
that thing at that moment no matter what happens later. Contrary to the past, the
future is open. The world can continue in various ways after indeterminist moments.
Thus the truth of future propositions is not settled at such moments. It depends on
which historical continuation of that moment is under consideration. When there are
different possible historic continuations of a moment, its actual future continuation
is not then determined. However, as Occam7 pointed out, if the world continues after
a moment, it will continue in a unique way. The actual historic continuation of each
non final moment will be unique even if it is still undetermined at that very moment.
Indeterminism cannot prevent that uniqueness.
Human agents who persist in an indeterminist world, have expectations and make
plans. According to phenomenology and philosophy of mind, human agents who are
directed by virtue of their intentionality towards things and facts of the world, are
intrinsically oriented at each moment of their active life towards the real continuation
of the world. We all ignore how the world will continue but we are intrinsically
oriented at each moment towards the real continuation of that moment. So we always
distinguish conceptually that real continuation from other possible continuations
whenever we act or think in the world. Whoever attempts at a moment to achieve
a future objective, intends to achieve that objective in the real continuation of that
moment. Whoever foresees or wishes to have a future grandchild, foresees or wishes
that grandchild in the real future. So in my approach both the moment and the
historic continuation of the moment are to be considered in order to evaluate our
actions and attitudes oriented towards the future. Consequently8 our elementary
illocutions and propositional attitudes at each moment have or will have a certain
satisfaction value even if that satisfaction value is still then undetermined when they
have a future propositional content. In order to keep a present promise and execute a
present intention to give things later, an agent must give later these things in the real
continuation of the world. Other possible historic continuations do not matter.9
According to my temporal logic every moment m has then a proper history
hm in each model. Whenever a moment m is the final moment of a history h,
that history h is its proper history hm. All moments that belong to the proper
history of an indeterminist moment have of course the same proper history in each
7 See Prior (1967).
8 See my paper “Towards a Formal Pragmatics of Discourse” (Vanderveken 2013).
9 Belnap N., M. Perloff and Ming Xu who reject the idea that each moment of utterance has a proper
history have to strongly complicate the theory of satisfaction. See Belnap et al. (2001, 151).
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model. A proposition is true at a moment m according to a denotation assignment in
a model when it is true at moment m in the history hm of that moment according to
that assignment.
Two moments of time m and m′ are coinstantaneous when they belong to the
same instant. Coinstantaneous moments are on the same horizontal line in each tree-
like frame. One can analyze historic necessity by quantifying over coinstantaneous
moments. The proposition that P is then necessary (in symbols P) is true at a
moment according to a model when P is true at all coinstantaneous moments accord-
ing to all histories in that model. The notion of historic necessity is stronger than
that of settled truth. The represented fact is then not only established but inevitable.
According to traditional philosophy there are no inevitable actions and intentions.
Moreover the possible causes and effects so to speak of actions of any agent at
a moment are limited to those which are possible outcomes of the way the world
has been up to that moment. As Belnap and Perloff (1992) pointed out, in order to
explicate historical relevance we must consider coinstantaneous moments having
the same past. Such moments are called alternative moments. Thus m1 and m2 are
alternative moments in the last figure. Logical or universal necessity is stronger than
historic necessity. The proposition that P is universally necessary (in symbols: P)
is true in a circumstance according to a model when P is true in all possible cir-
cumstances in that model. In that case the fact represented is always inevitable. A
proposition P is obviously tautological according to a model when it is true in every
possible circumstance according to any possible denotation assignment. The notion
of obvious tautologyhood is the strongest modal notion. The represented fact is then
analytically inevitable subjectively as well as objectively.
2 My New Approach in the Logic of Propositional Attitudes10
As I said earlier, propositional attitudes of human agents are about objects that
they represent under concepts. Each agent has consciously or potentially11 in mind
a certain set of attributes and concepts at each moment. That set of propositional
constituents is of course empty when the agent does not exist. In my view, no agent
can have a propositional attitude without having in mind all attributes and concepts
of its content. Otherwise, he or she would be unable to determine under which
conditions that attitude is satisfied. In order to desire to be bishop one must understand
characteristic features determined by meaning of the property of being bishop.
Secondly, possible denotation assignments to propositional constituents rather
than possible circumstances are compatible with the satisfaction of agents’ attitudes.
10 See my three papers “A General Logic of Propositional Attitudes” (Vanderveken 2008b),
“Beliefs, Desires and Minimal Rationality” (Vanderveken 2009b), and “On the Imperfect but
Minimal Rationality of Human Agents” (Vanderveken 2012).
11 We have unconsciously in mind at each conscious moment of our existence a lot of concepts
and attributes that we could in principle express at that moment given our language.
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So there corresponds to each agent a and moment m in each model a unique set
Belief(a,m) of possible denotation assignments to attributes and concepts that are
compatible with the truth of beliefs of that agent at that moment. When the agent a
has no attribute in mind at the moment m, Belief(a,m) is the entire set Val of all pos-
sible denotation assignments to senses. In that case, that agent has then no attitudes.
Otherwise, Belief(a,m) is always a non empty proper subset of Val. For whoever has
in mind senses respects meaning postulates governing them in his possible use and
interpretation of language. So there always are possible denotation assignments to
these senses compatible with what that agent then believes. In my view, an agent a
believes a proposition at a moment m when he or she has then in mind all its concepts
and attributes and that proposition is true at that moment according to all possible
denotation assignments of Belief (a,m) compatible with the truth of his or her beliefs
at that moment. Our present beliefs directed at the future (previsions, expectations)
will become true if things will be as we now believe in the actual future continuation
of the present moment.
Similarly, to each agent a and moment m there corresponds in each model a
unique non empty set Desire(a,m) of possible denotation assignments to attributes
and concepts that are compatible with the realization of all desires of that agent at
that moment. There is however an important difference between desire and belief.
Agents can believe, but they cannot desire, that objects have properties or entertain
relations without believing that they could be otherwise. For any desire contains a
preference. Whoever desires something distinguishes two different ways in which
represented objects could be in the actual world. In the preferred ways, objects are
in the world as the agent desires, in the other ways, they are not. The agent’s desire
is realized in the first case, it is unrealized in the second case. Thus in order that
an agent a desires the fact represented by a proposition P at a moment m, it is
not enough that he or she has then in mind all attributes and concepts of P and
that the proposition P is true at that moment according to all denotation assign-
ments of Desire(a,m) compatible with the realization of his or her desire at that
moment. That proposition must moreover be false in at least one circumstance accord-
ing to that agent. Otherwise that agent would not then prefer the existence of the
represented fact.
My explication of belief and desire is compatible with philosophy of mind. It
accounts for conscious and unconscious attitudes. Whoever has a conscious belief or
desire has consciously in mind all attributes and concepts of its propositional content.
Whoever has an unconscious belief or desire has unconsciously in mind some of its
attributes and concepts. He or she could then express these senses thanks to his or
her language. My approach also accounts for the fact that human agents are neither
logically omniscient nor perfectly rational. We do not have in mind all expressible
concepts and attributes.12 So we ignore tautological as well as necessary truths. Our
knowledge is limited: we ignore how objects are in a lot of circumstances espe-
12 We ignore the meaning of certain words. Moreover the languages that we speak have limited
expressive capacities. We regularly enrich our languages in order to express new concepts and
attributes that we discover.
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cially in future circumstances. Many assignments associating different denotations
to attributes in these circumstances are then compatible with our beliefs. We have
moreover false beliefs and unsatisfied desires. So the real denotation assignment is
often incompatible with the satisfaction of our beliefs and desires. Possible denota-
tion assignments compatible with our beliefs and desires can even violate essential
properties of objects. In that case we have necessarily false beliefs and insatisfiable
desires. My analysis explains why we are sometimes inconsistent.
Predicative logic also explicates why propositions true in the same circumstances
can have a different cognitive or volitive value. Some have different structures of
constituents. So are logically equivalent propositions that mothers are women and
that mothers are not ordinals. Their expression requires different acts of predication.
Others are not true according to the same possible denotation assignments. So are
necessarily true propositions that whales are whales and that whales are mammals.
We do not understand them as being true in the same conditions. Thus we can assert or
believe necessary truths without asserting or believing others. Among all necessary
truths, few are obvious tautologies like the proposition that whales are whales. We
believed in the past that whales were fishes.
However in my approach, human agents always remain minimally rational: they
cannot be totally irrational. First of all, agents cannot believe or desire everything
since in every model some possible denotation assignments are compatible with
the satisfaction of their beliefs and desires. Moreover, whoever possesses certain
beliefs and desires is eo ipso committed to possessing others. Indeed all possible
denotation assignments compatible with our beliefs and desires respect meaning
postulates. Human agents are therefore minimally logically omniscient: we cannot
have in mind an obviously tautological proposition without knowing for certain
that it is necessarily true. Represented objects could not be otherwise according to
us. Similarly, obvious contradictions (negations of obvious tautologies) are false in
every possible circumstance according to any agent. We can neither believe nor desire
obvious contradictions. Some hope that arithmetic is complete (a necessarily false
proposition if Gödel’s proof is right). But agents could never believe or desire both
the completeness and the incompleteness of arithmetic (an obvious contradiction).
Moreover we cannot desire the existence of facts represented by obvious tautologies.
In order to desire facts we must believe that these facts could not occur. One can
desire to drink; one can also desire not to drink. But no one could desire to drink or
not drink.
2.1 Analysis of Psychological Modes and Possession Conditions
of Attitudes
Descartes in his treatise on Les passions de l’âme (Descartes 1953) analyzed a
large number of propositional attitudes. Contemporary logic and analytic philoso-
phy only consider a few paradigmatic attitudes such as belief, knowledge, desire
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and intention. Could we use Cartesian analysis to develop a larger theory of all
propositional attitudes? Searle in Chap. 1 of Intentionality criticized Descartes who
tends to reduce all such attitudes to beliefs and desires. Indeed many different kinds of
attitudes e.g. fear, regret and sadness reduce to the same sums of beliefs and desires.
Moreover, our intentions are much more than a desire to do an action with a belief that
we are able to do it. Clearly all cognitive attitudes (e.g. conviction, faith, confidence,
knowledge, certainty, presumption, pride, arrogance, surprise, amazement, stupe-
faction, prevision, anticipation and expectation) are beliefs and all volitive attitudes
(e.g. wish, will, intention, ambition, project, hope, aspiration, satisfaction, pleasure,
enjoyment, delight, gladness, joy, elation, amusement, fear, regret, sadness, sorrow,
grief, remorse and terror) are desires. But psychological modes divide into other
components than the basic categories of cognition and volition. Let me now present
these new components.
Many complex psychological modes have a proper way of believing or desiring,
proper conditions on their propositional content or proper preparatory conditions.
First of all, we feel our beliefs and desires in a lot of ways. Many modes require
a special cognitive or volitive way of believing or desiring. Thus, knowledge is a
belief based on strong evidence that gives confidence and guarantees truth. Whoever
has an intention feels such a strong desire that he or she is disposed to act in order
to realize that desire. From a logical point of view, a cognitive or volitive way is a
function f which restricts basic psychological categories. Like illocutionary forces,
modes also have propositional content and preparatory conditions. Like predictions,
previsions and anticipations are directed towards the future. Intentions are desires
to carry out a present or future action. From a logical point of view, a condition
on the propositional content is a function fθ that associates which each agent and
moment a set of propositions. The propositional content conditions of predictions and
previsions associate with each agent and moment the set of propositions which are
future with respect to that moment. Moreover any agent of a propositional attitude
or of an elementary illocution presupposes certain propositions. Certain of these
presuppositions are propositional presuppositions that depend on their propositional
content. Whoever refers to the king of Belgium presupposes that there is one and
only one king of Belgium. All illocutions and attitudes with the same propositional
content have the same propositional presuppositions. Other presuppositions depend
on the psychological mode and illocutionary force. They are determined by so called
preparatory conditions. Thus promises and intentions have the preparatory condition
that the agent is then able to do the action represented by their propositional content.
Whoever promises and intends to do something presupposes that he or she can do
it. His or her attitude and illocution would be defective if that proposition were
then false. In the illocutionary case the speaker who presupposes can lie in order to
mislead the hearer. In the psychological case however the agent cannot lie to him or
herself. Whoever has an attitude both believes and presupposes that its preparatory
conditions are fulfilled. A preparatory condition is a function f associating with each
agent, moment and propositional content a set of propositions that the agent would
presuppose and believe if he had then an attitude with that preparatory condition
and propositional content. The sets of cognitive and volitive ways, of propositional
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content and of preparatory conditions are Boolean algebras. They contain a neutral
element and they are closed under the operations of union and intersection.
On the basis of my analysis, one can formally distinguish different kinds of atti-
tudes like fear, regret and sadness which apparently reduce to the same sums of beliefs
and desires. Identical psychological modes have the same components. Possession
conditions of propositional attitudes are entirely determined by components of their
mode and their propositional content. By definition, an agent a possesses a cognitive
(or volitive) attitude of the form M(P) at a moment m when he or she has then a
belief (or desire) with the propositional content P, he or she feels then that belief (or
desire) that P in the cognitive (or volitive) way M proper to psychological mode M,
the proposition P then satisfies propositional content conditions θM(a,m) and finally
that agent then presupposes and believes all propositions M(a,m,P) determined
by preparatory conditions of mode M with respect to the content P. Thus an agent
intends that P at a moment when proposition P then represents a present or future
action of that agent, he or she desires so much that action that he or she is committed
to carrying it out and moreover that agent then presupposes and believes to be able
to carry it out. Whoever has an intention intends to act sooner or later. Sometimes
the agent intends to act at the very moment of the intention. He or she has then
an intention to act in the present (what Searle (1982) calls an intention in action).
Sometimes the agent has a prior intention: he or she intends to act at a posterior
moment. Most agents who have an intention at a moment have previously formed
that intention or they form it at that very moment. They have committed themselves
to doing the intended action. Whoever has the intention to act in the present forms
his or her intention at the very moment of that intention. So agents of intentions in
action perform the very act of forming these intentions.
An attitude strongly commits an agent to another at a moment when he or she
could not then have that attitude without having the second. Thus whoever believes
that it will rain tomorrow then foresees rain tomorrow. Some attitudes strongly com-
mit the agent to another at particular moments. Whoever believes now that it will
rain tomorrow foresees rain tomorrow. The day after tomorrow the same belief won’t
be a prevision. It will be a belief about the past. An attitude contains another when
it strongly commits any agent to that other attitude at any moment. There are strong
and weak psychological commitments just as there are strong and weak illocutionary
commitments (see Searle and Vanderveken 1985). One must distinguish between
the overt possession of an attitude and a simple psychological commitment to that
attitude. Whoever believes that every man is mortal is weakly committed to believing
that Nebuchadnezzar is mortal, even if he has not Nebuchadnezzar’s concept in mind
and if he or she does not then possess the second belief. No one could simultaneously
believe the first universal proposition and the negation of the second.
Psychological modes are not a simple sequence of a basic psychological cate-
gory, a cognitive or volitive way, a propositional content condition and a preparatory
condition. For their components are not independent. Certain components determine
others of the same or of another kind. Thus the volitive way of the mode of inten-
tion determines the propositional content condition that it represents a present or
future action of the agent and the preparatory condition that that agent is then able to
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carry out that action. The two primitive modes of belief and desire are the simplest
cognitive and volitive modes. They have no special cognitive or volitive way, no spe-
cial propositional content or preparatory condition. Complex modes are obtained by
adding to primitive modes special cognitive or volitive ways, propositional content
conditions or preparatory conditions. Thus the mode of prevision Mforesee is obtained
by adding to the mode of belief the propositional content condition θfuture that asso-
ciates with each agent and moment the set of propositions that are future with respect
to that moment. Mforesee = [θfuture]Belief . The mode of hope is obtained from that of
desire by adding the special cognitive way that the agent is then uncertain as regards
the existence and the inexistence of the represented fact and the preparatory condi-
tion that that fact is then possible. The mode of satisfaction is obtained from that
of desire by adding the preparatory condition that the desired fact exists. The mode
of pleasure has, in addition, the volitive way that the satisfaction of the desire puts
the agent in a state of pleasure and the preparatory condition that it is good for the
agent. Because all operations on modes add new components, they generate stronger
modes. Attitudes M(P) with a complex mode M contains attitudes M′(P) whose mode
M′ have less components. A lexical analysis of terms for attitudes based on my com-
ponential analysis explains which name stronger psychological modes. I have drawn
semantic tableaux in order to show comparative strength between modes.13
Notice that contrary to truth functions, modal and temporal propositions as well as
propositions attributing attitudes to agents contain more elementary propositions than
their arguments. They serve indeed to predicate new modal, temporal, epistemic and
volitive attributes to objects of reference. In thinking that God cannot make mistakes
we predicate of Him the modal property of infallibility. In thinking that God created
the world we predicate of Him the past property of having created the world. In
thinking that the pope believes that God exists, we predicate of God the epistemic
property of being existent according to the pope. Whoever wishes that God forgives
him predicates of God the property that he would prefer His pardon.
2.2 Analysis of Satisfaction Conditions of Propositional Attitudes
The general notion of satisfaction condition in logic is based on that of corre-
spondence. Agents of propositional attitudes and elementary illocutionary acts are
directed towards facts of the world represented by their propositional content. Most
often they establish a correspondence or fit between their ideas and things in the
case of attitudes and between their words and things in the case of illocutions. Their
attitudes and illocutions have for that reason satisfaction conditions. In order that the
propositional attitude or elementary illocution of an agent at a moment is satisfied,
there must first of all be a correspondence between that agent’s ideas or words and
represented things in the world in the history of that moment. The propositional
13 See the tableaux at the end of my paper “Formal Semantics for propositional attitudes”
(Vanderveken 2011).
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content must represent a fact that exist at that moment or will exist in the world in
its real historic continuation.
As I already said, agents live in an indeterminist world. Their future is open. At
each moment where they think and act, they ignore how the world will continue.
However, their attitudes and actions are always directed by virtue of their intention-
ality toward the real historic continuation. Whenever parents refer to their next child
they refer to their next child in the real future. In order that a present attitude or
illocution directed at the future be satisfied, it is not enough that things will be at a
posterior moment as the agent now represents them. They must be so later in the real
future. So the satisfaction of propositional attitudes and elementary illocutionary acts
of an agent at a moment requires the truth at that very moment of their propositional
content. The notion of satisfaction is a generalization of the notion of actual truth14
that takes into account the direction of fit of attitudes and illocutions. The relation
of fit or of correspondence is symmetrical: if a proposition fits the world then the
world fits that proposition. However there is more to the notion of satisfaction than
to that of actual truth because one must consider the direction of fit from which the
correspondence must be achieved between the mind and the world in the analysis of
satisfaction of attitudes, just as one must consider the direction of fit from which the
correspondence must be achieved between language and the world in the analysis of
satisfaction of illocutions.
There are four possible directions of fit between ideas and things, just as there are
four possible directions of fit between words and things. Just as assertive illocutions
have the language-to-world direction of fit, cognitive attitudes have the mind-to-world
direction of fit. They are satisfied when their propositional content fits the world. In
that case the agent’s ideas15 must correspond to things as they are then in the world.
On the contrary, volitive attitudes have the opposite world-to-mind direction of fit
just as commissive and directive illocutions have the opposite world-to-language
direction of fit. They are satisfied only if the world fits their propositional content.
In that case represented things in the world must correspond to the agent’s ideas.
Each direction of fit between mind and the world determines which side is at
fault in case of dissatisfaction. In the cognitive and assertive cases, the agent is
at fault in the case of dissatisfaction. So when the agent realizes that there is no
correspondence between his or her ideas and represented, that agent immediately
changes his or her beliefs and is ready to revise his or her assertions. This is why
the truth and falsehood predicates apply so well to satisfied cognitive attitudes and
assertive illocutions. A belief and an assertion at a moment are satisfied when they
are then true and unsatisfied when they are then false. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction
amount to actual truth and actual falsehood in the case of cognitive attitudes and
assertive illocutions. However, the truth predicates do not apply at all to volitive
14 We need an actuality connective for a right account of satisfaction conditions. A proposition of
the form Actually P is true in a circumstance m/h when it is true at the moment m according to its
history hm.
15 In the case of illocutions the agent’s ideas are the ideas that he or she expresses by his or her
words.
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attitudes whose direction of fit goes from things to mind just as they do not apply
to commissive and directive illocutions whose direction of fit goes from things to
language. For the world and not the agent is at fault in the case of dissatisfaction
of volitive attitudes and commissive and directive illocutions. In that case, the agent
can keep his desires and remains dissatisfied. He can repeat his previous commissive
and directive illocutions. So we use other predicates of satisfaction. Satisfied wishes
and desires are realized; satisfied hopes and aspirations are fulfilled, and satisfied
intentions, projects and plans are executed. Satisfied promises and vows are kept,
satisfied orders and commands are obeyed, satisfied requests are granted, etc.
Most often, agents having a volitive attitude desire the existence of the fact repre-
sented by the propositional content no matter how that fact turns to be existent in the
world. So most volitive attitudes that agents have at a moment are satisfied when their
content is then true, no matter for which reason. Things are then such as the agent
desires them to be, no matter what is the cause of their existence. The only exceptions
to this rule are volitive attitudes like will, intentions, projects, plans and ambitions
whose proper volitive way requires that things fit the agent’s ideas because he or she
wants them in that way. Like commissive and directive illocutionary acts (orders,
commands, pledges and promises), such volitive attitudes have self-referential sat-
isfaction conditions. Their satisfaction requires more than the existence of the fact
represented by their propositional content. It requires that that fact turns to be existent
in order to satisfy the agent’s attitude. In order to execute a prior intention and to
keep a previous promise, an agent must do more than carry out later the intended
and promised action in the real future; he or she must carry out that action because
of that previous intention and promise. If the agent does not act for that reason, (that
agent has forgotten his or her previous intention and promise or he or she does not
act freely), that agent does not then execute the prior intention (or keep then the
previous promise). Like illocutionary logic, the logic of attitudes can explain such
a self-referential satisfaction by relying on intentional causation. The attitude and
illocution of the agent are then a practical reason why the represented fact turns to
be existent.16
As Searle pointed out in Intentionality, certain volitive modes like joy, gladness,
pride, pleasure, regret, sadness, sorrow, and shame have like expressive illocutions
the empty direction of fit. Agents who have such attitudes do not want to establish
a correspondence between their ideas and represented things in the world. They
just take for granted either correspondence or lack of correspondence between their
ideas and things. In the case of joy, gladness, pride and pleasure, the agent believes
that the desired fact exists. In the case of regret, sadness, sorrow and shame, he
or she believes on the contrary that it does not exist. The first attitudes have the
special preparatory condition Truth that their propositional content is then true. The
second attitudes which contain a desire of the inexistence of the fact represented by
their propositional content have the opposite preparatory condition Falsehood that
their content is then false. Volitive attitudes with such special preparatory condition
have the empty direction of fit because their agent could not intend to establish a
16 My logic of action has a reason connective to express intentional causation.
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correspondence. This is why they do not have satisfaction conditions. Instead of
being satisfied or dissatisfied, they are just appropriate or inappropriate. They are
inappropriate when their preparatory condition of actual truth or falsehood is wrong
or when their proper psychological mode does not suit the fact represented by their
content. No agent should be ashamed of an action that he has not made or that is
exemplary and good for all.
As Candida de Sousa Melo (2002) pointed out, declaratory acts of thought have
the double direction of fit between mind and things. In making verbal and mental
declarations, the speaker changes represented things of the world just by way of
thinking or saying that he is changing them. Whoever gives by declaration a name
to a new thing acts in such a way that that thing has then that name. In such a case,
an act of the mind brings about the represented fact. Because attitudes are states and
not mental actions, they could not have the double direction of fit.
3 Intentionality in the Logic of Action
The aim of this section is to give a formal account of the intentionality of human
agents and to explicate the nature of their intentional and basic individual actions.
By way of performing individual actions at a moment, agents bring about facts in
the world. They make then true propositions representing these facts. Whenever
they act intentionally they are moreover directed towards facts that they attempt to
bring about in the world. The logical constant of Belnap’s logic is the connective stit
(“sees to it that”) which serves to express propositions according to which an agent
a does P (in symbols [a stit P]). Because attempts are constitutive of intentional
actions, my logic contains a new logical constant Tries of attempt in order to express
propositions of the form [a Tries P] according to which the agent a tries to do P.
Notice that propositions that attribute actions and attempts to agents predicate new
agentive attributes. In thinking that a police officer is making the hostages free, we
attribute to that officer the agentive property of freeing hostages. Prefixes like “en”
serve to compose agentive predicates in English. To enable is to make able and to
enrich is to make rich. Similarly in thinking that a person is making an attempt to be
elected, we attribute to that person the agentive property of being a candidate for an
election. We need an analysis of agentive attributes in the logic of action.
I will first make basic considerations about individual actions and attempts. When
an agent performs the individual action of bringing about a fact at a moment, he or
she performs that action at that moment no matter how the world continues. The
truth (or falsehood) of propositions of the form [a stit P] is then well established
at each moment. Agents can repeat individual actions of the same type at different
successive moments in a possible course of the world. They can request and request
again. Agents also perform individual actions of the same type at alternative moments.
When a player is in a checkmate position at a moment in a chess game, that player is a
loser at all alternative moments where he or she makes a move in that game. Moments
of time are logically related by virtue of actions of agents at these moments. From
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a logical point of view, to each agent a and moment m there always corresponds in
each model the set Actionam of coinstantaneous moments m′ which are compatible
with all the actions that agent a performs at the moment m. They are all, as Chellas
(1992) would say, “under the control of—or responsive to the actions of” of that
agent at that moment. When an agent a does not act at all at a moment m, all
moments coinstantaneous with m are compatible with his or her actions at that
moment. However, when he or she does P at moment m, the proposition P is true
at all moments m′ ∈ Actionam according to any history. In my view, the relation of
compatibility with actions is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. So when a moment
is compatible with all actions of an agent at another moment, that agent performs
exactly the same actions at these moments. Of course because of indeterminism, the
same actions of that agent can have different physical effects (that are not actions)
in the world at different moments which are compatible with what he or she does
at that moment. Every agent persists in the world. What an agent does at a moment
depends on how the world has been up to that moment. This is why the relation of
compatibility with actions satisfies the so called historical relevance condition. Only
alternative moments having the same past as m can belong to Actionam. Moreover, as
Belnap said, the world goes on. Agents act in the same world. So at least one moment
m′ belongs to both sets Actionam and Actionbm for any two agents a and b.
Thanks to the new compatibility function, logic can start to analyze individual
actions. The proposition that P is true given what agent a does (in symbols aP) is
true in a circumstance m/h according to a model when proposition P is true at all
moments m′ ∈ Actionam compatible with the actions of agent a at m according to all
histories h′. Chellas (1992) tends to identify the very notion of action with the normal
modal operation corresponding to . However each proposition of the form aP is
true whenever proposition P is historically necessary. But no agent could bring about
an inevitable fact. Inevitable facts exist no matter what we do. So as Belnap pointed
out, proposition [a stit P] is stronger than aP; it implies that P could be false.
In their logic of agency, Belnap and Perloff (1992) use the logic of branching time
and von Neumann’s theory of games. Agents make free choices in time. The notion
of acting or choosing at a moment m is thought of as constraining the course of events
to lie within some particular subset of the possible histories available at that moment.
Belnap and Perloff first studied actions that are guaranteed by a past choice of the
agent. They made a theory of the so called achievement stit. However often agents
succeed in doing things that they had no prior intention to do. They spontaneously
attempt to do them. Moreover sometimes they do things that they would not have
wanted to do. Belnap et al. (2001) came to study later actions directed at the future
that are guaranteed by a present choice of the agent. They made a theory of the
deliberative stit.
My logic of agency is more general; it deals with individual actions made at the
very moment of the agent’s choice, no matter whether these actions are oriented
towards the present or the future. Attempts require a present choice of their agent.
Every intentional action contains a present intention in action, few execute a prior
intention. Most successful spontaneous attempts to move parts of one’s body cause
the movement at the very moment of the attempt. We emit sounds when we try to
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emit them in the contexts of oral utterances. Belnap’s analysis of action in terms of
ramified time has the merits of taking very seriously into consideration the temporal
and causative order of the world. I follow his approach under many aspects. But I
want to take into account the proper intentionality of agents that Belnap ignores. For
that reason, agents carry out too many actions in his logic. Suppose that a proposition
strictly implies another which is not then necessary. According to his analysis, an
agent cannot make the first proposition true without also making the second true,
even when the second proposition represents a fact that no agent could bring about
or even try to bring about at that moment. Thus whoever repeats an action sees to it
that he does that action and has done it in Belnap’s logic.
Let me now repeat the principles of my approach.17 In my logic, intentional actions
are primary as in philosophy. Some of our actions are involuntary. But any agent who
performs unintentionally an action could in principle have attempted that action, and
that unintentional action is generated by his or her intentional actions. The basic
actions of agents are their primary attempts that are means to make all their other
attempts; they generate all their other actions whether intentional or not. Agents know
and intend few effects of their basic actions. A lot of their actions are then involuntary.
However, not all unintended effects of intentional actions are involuntary actions, but
only those that are historically contingent and that the agent could have attempted. In
moving we inevitably agitate subatomic particles. Sometimes we are mistaken and
we fail. Such events which happen in our life do not constitute actions. Indeed we
could not move without agitating particles and our mistakes and failures could not
be intentional.18
My logic of action contains a theory of attempt and of action generation. In my
analysis, attempts are actions that agents make (rather than attitudes that they have).
Attempts are actions of a very special kind: personal, conscious, intentional, free
and successful. Only the agent can make his or her individual attempts. No one else
can make them. Thus when two agents succeed in doing the same action (e.g. to
drink) they do it thanks to different personal attempts (in that case different body
movements). Attempts are intrinsically intentional actions. There are no involuntary
attempts. When an agent makes an attempt, he or she makes that attempt in order to
do something else. Attempts are means to achieve ends. Whoever attempts to make
an attempt succeeds in making that attempt, but he or she can fail to reach his or her
objective. An attempt is essentially a mental act. Whoever attempts to raise the arm
can fail because of an external force. But he or she has anyway mentally made that
attempt in forming consciously his or her present intention to raise the arm. Among
intentional actions, attempts have then particular success conditions. It is enough to
try to make an attempt in order to make it eo ipso. Direct attempts by an agent to
move parts of one’s body are real basic actions. When an agent forms the present
intention to make a direct movement, an attempt is caused by the very formation of
17 See Vanderveken (2005b, 2008a).
18 Goldman (1970) notices that certain act properties like misspeaking, miscalculating, miscounting
seem to preclude intentionality. Such properties are not really act properties. We “suffer” mistakes.
We do not make them.
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that present intention, no matter whether he or she is in a standard condition or not
(Goldman 1970, 65). In case the agent of an attempt fails to reach his or her objective,
his or her attempt is then unsatisfied. In order to make a satisfied attempt, one must
make a good attempt in a right circumstance. Whoever attempts to invite a certain
person fails when he uses a wrong name or speaks to the wrong person. When agents
attempt to perform illocutions, the satisfaction conditions of their attempts are in
that case the so called success conditions of their attempted illocutions. Agents often
have an experience of their attempt when they fail (Searle 1982). Such an experience
presents or represents the satisfaction conditions of that attempt.19
My logic of action accounts for the minimal rationality of agents who are neither
perfectly rational nor entirely irrational. Minimal rationality in action is related to
the ways in which agents determine satisfaction conditions of their attempts. We can
intend and attempt to do impossible actions. However there are impossible actions
that we can neither intend nor attempt to do. My approach represents adequately
satisfaction conditions of intentions and attempts. To each agent a and moment m
there correspond two non empty sets: Intentionam and Attemptam in every model.
Intentionam contains all denotation assignments to senses which are compatible with
the execution of all intentions of that agent at that moment; Attemptam is the set of
all pairs of denotation assignments to senses which are respectively compatible with
the realisation and the satisfaction of his or her attempts at that moment. Attempts
like intentions have the world-to-mind direction of fit. Only realized attempts can
be satisfied. Consequently all denotation assignments to senses compatible with the
satisfaction of attempts of an agent at a moment are compatible with their realisation
at that very moment: id2Attemptam ⊆ id1Attemptam. (In my symbolism, for any
Cartesian product X × Y , id1(X × Y) = X and id2(X × Y) = Y .) In my view, any
agent of an attempt forms the present intention to make then his or her attempt.
Because that attempt has an objective, he or she also forms the intention to achieve
that objective at that moment or later in the real historic continuation. Formally,
id2Attemptam ⊆ Intentionam ⊆ Desiream. Moreover, because attempts are actions,
each agent makes the same attempts at all moments compatible with his or her
actions. Thus id1Attemptam = id1Attemptam′ when m′ ∈ Actionam. And similarly for
id2Attemptam. There is no action without attempt. Consequently Actionam is the set
of all coinstantaneous moments with m when all possible denotation assignments
to senses belong to the set id1Attemptam. Different agents can attempt to achieve the
same objective (to push the car). However no agent can make the attempt of another
agent. Each agent does something irreducibly personal when he or she makes an
attempt. That agent forms then his or her present intention of making that attempt.
No one else can form that intention. So id1Attemptam = id1Attemptbm when a = b.
In order that an agent a try to make a proposition true at a moment m according to a
model, it is necessary but not sufficient that that proposition is true at that moment m
in history hm according to all denotation assignments of id2Attemptam. Agents never
19 Direct attempts of moving one’s body contain a presentation and attempts of making an illocution
a representation of their satisfaction conditions. Searle (1982) does not really consider the fact that
attempts are themselves actions.
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intend and attempt to make true propositions that are obviously tautological. They
only intend and attempt to carry out present or future actions. Because attempts are
intentional actions, they have the same propositional content conditions as intentions.
The set of propositions representing the objectives of an agent a at moment m accord-
ing to a model is included in the set θintention(a,m). In my approach, a proposition of
the form [a Tries P] according to which an agent a attempts to bring about the fact
represented by P is true in a circumstance m/h when firstly, that agent forms the con-
scious intention that P at that moment (and consequently at all alternative moments
m′ ∈ Actionam compatible with his or her actions then) and secondly, the proposition
P is true at moment m in the history hm according to all denotation assignments of
id2 Attemptam compatible with the satisfaction of his or her attempts at that moment.20
Every attempt at a moment is then well established and his or her agent believes then
to be able to reach its objective. Moreover the agent attempts to make all his or her
attempts. Because agents are minimally rational they never attempt nor intend to do
things that they know to be necessary or impossible. They also never attempt nor
intend to do something in the past.
As one can expect, the set Goalam of all propositions representing objectives aimed
by an agent a at the moment m is empty in a model when the agent a is unconscious
or does not act at all at that moment according to that model. Attempts are indeed
conscious actions. Each agent attempts to achieve the same goals at every moment
compatible with his or her actions. Goalam = Goalam′ when m′ ∈ Actionam. Any non
empty set Goalam is moreover finite. Human agents can only make a finite number of
predications and consequently they can only form finitely many intentions and make
finitely many attempts. The objectives of an agent at a moment are either present or
future. Whenever the agent attempts to achieve a present objective, he or she either
succeeds or fails at the very moment of his or her attempt. That attempt is then
either satisfied or unsatisfied. In case the agent has a future objective (he requests an
answer), he or she forms a prior intention and it is not then determined whether the
attempt will or not be satisfied. All depends on what will happen in the real future.
No agent can succeed in achieving at a moment a future objective. Remember that
future propositions are false at each final moment. The most that agents can do is to
act in such a way that the future fact that they intend to bring about will sooner or later
come into existence, if the world continues, no matter how. Whoever hurts mortally
an adversary will provoke his or her death if the world goes on, given actual physical
laws. Agents can make more or less good contributions to the achievement of their
future objectives. By making a move in a chess game one can put the adversary in
an inevitable losing position. In that case it is then settled that one will be the winner
if the game is pursued.
At each moment of action, any agent makes a few very basic attempts whose
objectives are present and entirely personal to him or her. So are our primary attempts
to move directly parts of our body or to make purely mental acts of conceptual thought
20 Bratman (1987) criticizes the principle that whoever attempts to do something intends to do it.
But his counter-examples do not work or they concern attempts that are not momentary but last
during an interval of time.
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like a judgement in soliloquy. Let BasicGoalam be the set of all propositions of Goalam
that represent the very basic attempts of the agent a at a moment m. Two non empty
sets BasicGoalam and BasicGoalsbm are disjoint when their agents a and b are different.
All our attempts at a moment are related by the relation of being means to achieve
our goals at that very moment. Our few basic attempts at each moment are therefore
primary in a double sense. First, they are not effects of other attempts. Second, they
all together cause all our other attempts because they are made for that purpose.
As philosophers pointed out, human agents act intentionally and especially they
form their attitudes and they make their attempts for certain practical reasons,
because they have then certain beliefs, desires, intentions and objectives and also
because of simultaneous and sometimes anterior actions, illocutions and attitudes.
They have cognitive attitudes and believe propositions for theoretical reasons. Their
actions and attitudes are often motivated by several reasons. They keep a previous
promise not only because they have put themselves under the obligation to keep it
but also in order to please the hearer and get a favour. They suppose or believe that a
proposition is true because of their previous experience and of background or social
knowledge. However they would not make their attempts and they would not have
their cognitive attitudes if they had no practical and no theoretical reasons at all.
Indeed their practical and theoretical reasons are the very intentional causes of their
attempts and cognitive attitudes. For each agent a and moment m let Reasonsam be the
set of propositions representing all theoretical and practical reasons of that agent at
that moment according to a model. Each agent has of course the same practical rea-
sons to make his or her attempts at each moment compatible with his or her actions.
Among the practical causes of any attempt there is the agent’s conscious intention to
make that attempt. There are also his or her basic attempts that cause at that moment
all his or her other attempts. BasicGoalam ⊂ Reasonsam.
As I said earlier, agents succeed in performing attempted actions, when they
make good attempts in right circumstances. It remains to explicate fully the notion
of success. As Davidson and Searle pointed out, in order that an agent succeeds in
bringing about a fact, it is not enough that he or she tries and that the fact occurs.
The attempted fact must be caused by his or her own attempt. Otherwise, the agent
failed. Sometimes the agent’s attempt is the cause why the attempted fact occurs.
Often however there is causal overdetermination. This happens when several agents
bring about the attempted fact, or when the agent brings about the fact because of
several simultaneous attempts. In such cases the agent’s attempt under consideration
is just a practical reason among others why the attempted fact occurred. One cannot
then assert counterfactually that if the agent had not made that particular attempt,
the fact would not have occurred. Like illocutionary logic, the logic of action must
consider agents’ practical reasons in order to explicate intentional causation and
satisfaction-conditions of attempts. Attempts like commissive and directive illocu-
tions have the things-to-mind direction of fit. In order that an agent succeeds in
achieving an objective, his or her attempt must be a practical reason of his or her
success.
However the logic of action has to consider other causes than agents’ practical
reasons in order to explicate success. As Goldman pointed out, certain attempt tokens
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generate other action tokens in various ways. In addition to intentional causes, natural
causes, conventions as well as particular facts existing in the situation in which they
act, enable agents to achieve their objectives. An agent who moves the hand touches
material objects that constitute an obstacle. He or she would not touch such objects in
another situation where they would not be present. Whoever flips the switch succeeds
in turning on the light when the electric lighting system works. The agent’s attempt
physically causes light because of other facts (there is electric transmission) existing
in the situation where he or she acts. His or her attempt and these other facts all
together physically cause the intended effect given laws of nature. As I said earlier,
the logic of ramified time takes into consideration the causative and temporal order
of the world. Thus all pertinent natural laws thanks to which agent acts at a moment
hold by hypothesis at all coinstantaneous moments.
Agents also succeed in achieving their objectives because of established conven-
tions. According to conventions, certain action tokens count as constituting others
in certain situations. By raising the hand, one succeeds in voting for a proposition in
a meeting where participants follow such a convention. Agents of course know their
practical reasons as well as the conventions that they follow in making their attempts.
But they do not know all relevant physical laws; they often ignore particular physical
causes and facts of the situation and sometimes even established conventions which
enabled them to achieve their objectives. Logic has to take into consideration such
other reasons for success.
Now when an agent succeeds in achieving an objective because of certain conven-
tions, natural causes and particular facts, these conventions are established and these
causes and particular facts exist by hypothesis in what philosophers call the situa-
tion where the agent acts. These established conventions, causes and particular facts
exist even at all moments compatible with the actions of that agent at that moment,
no matter whether or not he or she is aware of them. At each moment m where an
agent a acts, propositions that represent all other reasons for his or her success at
that moment are then true at all alternative moments m′ ∈ Actionam. Moreover, given
preceding considerations, when the achievement of the agent’s objective is due to
natural causes, conventions and particular facts existing in the situation of his or her
attempt, it is then historically necessary that these natural causes, conventions and
facts cause the existence of attempted facts at all moments which are coinstantaneous
with the moment of action of that agent.
One can express and interpret in my logic propositions according to which the
agent’s attempt to bring about certain facts is a practical reason for the truth of
certain propositions.
In my symbolism such propositions are of the form [ρ[aQ][aTriesP]]): they
mean that Q is true given what agent a does because he or she tries P. In my
approach, a proposition of the form [ρ[aQ][aTriesP]] is true in a circumstance m/h
when firstly, both propositions [aQ] and [aTriesP]] are true in that circumstance,
secondly, Q is not then historically necessary (it is false in at least one circumstance
whose moment is coinstantaneous with m) and thirdly, for some proposition R true
in all circumstances m′/h′ compatible with a’s actions at m, it is then historically nec-
essary that both [aTriesP] and R implies [aQ], that is to say when both [aTriesP]
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and R are true in a circumstance coinstantaneous with m, so is [aQ]. The new
proposition R represents all particular facts, natural causes and established conven-
tions existing in the situation of the agent that are other reasons why the agent brings
about the fact represented by Q.
On the basis of preceding considerations, I define as follows success and failure.
In my object-language the two formulas [a succeeds P] and [aFailsP]) which mean
respectively that agent a succeeds and that agent a fails in doing P are abbreviations.
[a succeeds P] =def ([aTriesP]) ∧ [aP] ∧ (¬P) ∧ [ρ[aP][aTriesP]].
And [aFailsP] =def ([aTriesP]) ∧ ([¬aP] ∨ (P) ∨ (¬ρ[aP][aTriesP])).
No agent can succeed or fail in doing something unless he or she makes an attempt.
So we do not succeed in performing our unintentional actions. We just perform them.
How could we now explicate the general notion of an individual action (whether
intentional or not)? Given the principles of my approach, I advocate the following
definition: an agent a acts so as to bring about P at a moment when firstly, the
proposition P is true given what he or she then does, secondly, P is then historically
contingent, thirdly, the agent a could then try P and fourthly, he or she brings about P
because of a present attempt at that moment. In other words, a proposition of the form
[a stit P] is true in a circumstance m/h according to a model when the proposition P
is false in at least one coinstantaneous circumstance, but P is true at all alternative
moments m′ ∈ Actionam according to all histories, there is at least one coinstantaneous
moment m′ where P ∈ Goala
m′ and the proposition [ρ[aP][aTriesQ]] is true in
circumstance m/h for at least one proposition Q ∈ Goalam. In my conception of
action, there is no action without a simultaneous attempt of the agent. What agents
do at each moment has to be caused by their intentional actions at that very moment.
Thus dead agents do not act anymore even if their actions can still have effects after
their death. According to philosophers, certain basic intentional actions generate all
our other actions. So are in my approach the sums of our basic attempts at each
moment. Because they are attempts, we succeed in performing our basic actions
whenever we attempt them. Using the counterfactual conditional, one can say that
if an agent had not made his or her basic attempts at that moment he or she would
not then have done anything. In my logic the conjunction (P1 & . . . & Pn) of all
Pk ∈ BasicGoalam represents the basic action of agent a at moment m. Whenever
Pk ∈ BasicGoalam, there is no other Q ∈ Goalam such that the attempt that Q is a
practical reason for Pk .
4 Fundamental Valid Laws
In his paper on “Desire, Deliberation and Action”, Searle (2005) expressed skep-
ticism about the logic of practical reason. Of course, because of their proper
things-to-mind direction of fit, desire and other volitive modes have properties
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like indetachability and unavoidable inconsistency which complexify their formal
explication. Agents of deliberations are not forced to commit themselves at the end
to given actions. They can revoke their prior intentions and not attempt to execute
them. When they make an attempt, they can fail. Such properties do not at all pre-
vent the development of the logic of practical reason. My logic of attitudes and
action explicates them entirely. Searle is moreover forced to admit the existence of
internalized logical relations of psychological and illocutionary commitment and
incompatibility because of the very principles of his philosophy of mind. According
to him, any agent of an attitude and of an intentional action has in mind the satisfaction
conditions of that attitude and the success conditions of that action. Consequently,
agents cannot have certain attitudes without having others and they cannot make
certain actions without making others and having certain attitudes.
In my approach, there is a proper logic (a recursive theory of possession and
satisfaction) for volitive attitudes just as there is a proper logic (a recursive theory
of success and satisfaction) for attempts and commissive and directive illocutions21
which all have the things-to-mind direction of fit. All kinds of attitudes and actions are
logically related by virtue of their felicity conditions. My logic explicates formally
specific properties of attitudes and illocutions with the things-to-mind direction of
fit. It also revises the current logical conception of rationality in explicating why
agents are imperfectly rational, why they are sometimes inconsistent and why they
do not make all valid theoretical inferences. It moreover explicates why they are not
logically omniscient, why they can ignore obvious tautologies as well as necessary
propositions. In my logic, the set of beliefs is neither closed under tautological nor
under strict implications. Indeed many propositions tautologically and strictly imply
other propositions with new concepts or attributes that agents might not have in mind.
Agents also ignore how propositions are related by strict implication. My logic also
explicates why agents always remain minimally rational in thinking and in acting
and solves psychological and illocutionary paradoxes like the paradoxes of the liar
and of the sophist. They are indeed minimally consistent; they cannot believe that an
obvious tautology is false. So agents know that certain facts could not occur without
others.
My predicative logic explicates a new strong propositional implication that is
much finer than Lewis’ strict implication and important for the analysis of strong and
weak psychological commitments. Formally, a proposition strongly implies another
when firstly whoever expresses that proposition can express the other and secondly,
it cannot be true in a circumstance according to a possible denotation assignment
unless the other proposition is also true in that circumstance according to that assign-
ment. Strong implication is finite, tautological, paraconsistent, decidable and a priori
known. Whoever believes a proposition also believes any proposition that it strongly
implies. He or she knows that it could not be true otherwise. Strong implication is also
partially compatible with desires, intentions and attempts. Whenever a proposition
strongly implies another, whoever attempts or intends to make it true also attempts
21 See the two volumes of my book Meaning and Speech Acts (Vanderveken 1990, 1991).
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or intends to make true the other in case that other proposition represents then a
possible goal of that agent.
Of course, the logic of desire and intention is very different from that of belief.
Agents can both intend to do something and believe that their intended action will
have a certain effect without eo ipso desiring and intending to produce that effect.
One can reject an offer and believe that one will irritate the agent of that offer with-
out desiring and intending to provoke such an attitude. There is sometimes a conflict
between the intentions and beliefs of an agent at a moment. Certain possible denota-
tion assignments to senses compatible with the execution of the agent’s intentions at
a moment are not compatible with the truth of his or her beliefs at that moment. For
unwanted effects of the intended action do not occur according to the first assign-
ments. Agents know that some of their beliefs could be false. This can even occur
when they believe that it is settled or even inevitable that their action will have a
certain unwanted consequence. Bratman and Searle have given a lot of convincing
examples. A prior intention to do something P and a belief that it is then necessary
that if P then Q do not commit the agent to a prior intention to do Q. We know that
we can wrongly believe that certain facts are inevitable. We would then be happier
if such facts would not occur. So Kant’s principle: “Whoever intends to achieve an
end thereby will the necessary means or effects that he or she knows to be part of the
achievement of that end” does not apply to prior intentions.
However because agents are rational they have to minimally coordinate their
cognitive and volitive states in trying to act in the world. So a restricted form of
Kant’s principle “Any agent who wills the end is committed to willing the necessary
means” applies to attempts which are intentions in action. In case the agent of an
attempt knows that in order to succeed he or she has to do something else, that agent
will try to do that other thing. In other words, whoever attempts to achieve an end
attempts to use means that he or she knows to be necessary. Such a restricted Kantian
principle is valid in my logic of action. When P and Q ∈ θPresent Intention(a, m) and
the agent a knows at moment m that (P ⇒ Q), if P ∈ Goalam then Q ∈ Goalam.
Let me give an example. Any agent knows that in order to invite someone one has
to make a request. Thus whoever tries to make an invitation eo ipso tries to make a
request. His or her attempted request then constitutes his or her attempted invitation.
As Goldman pointed out, certain action tokens generate others causally, conven-
tionally, simply and by extension. My logic of action explicates the various forms of
action generation. It can also characterize how illocutions which are the primary units
of meaning and communication in the use of language relate to other speech-acts (acts
of utterance, propositional acts, attempts at performing illocutions, and perlocution-
ary acts). Attempts at performing illocutions are new fundamental speech-acts in my
taxonomy. They are constitutive of meaning. Speakers attempt to publicly perform
illocutions by emitting signs. It remains to explicate how and under what conditions
they succeed and how successful illocutions generate others (invitations contain
requests) and have perlocutionary effects (the hearer is sometimes influenced). At
the basis of communication, agents attempt to move parts of their body and this
generates in the sense of Goldman in various ways their speech-acts. Generation
in communication is first physically causal (we orally utter sentences in producing
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sounds), next conventional (sentence-meaning serves to determine attempted illo-
cutions). Generation is sometimes simple (speakers succeed to perform attempted
illocutions when they use appropriate words in the right contexts) or by extension
(they sometimes indirectly perform non-literal illocutions). In order to explicate dif-
ferent kinds of speech-act generation, I intend to integrate illocutionary logic within
the logic of action.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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